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The Dynamics of Political Violence and Demonstrations in Somalia: Evidence from ACLED data

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Abstract. Background: Political violence primarily serves a symbolic purpose, with its cultural and emotional impacts outweighing the physical destruction it causes. Research on social movements has highlighted the significance of cultural dynamics in the emergence of political violence, examining both the internal and external aspects of radical groups. Demonstrations serve as a crucial negotiation tool for those challenging authoritarian regimes. Conflict is dynamic, adapting as parties react to each other's actions, shifts in power, and external interventions. Objective of the study: The study was guided by three objectives, which included A) to compare regional variations in the number of political events and associated fatalities in Somalia from January to November 2024 using ACLED data, B) to assess the correlation between the number of political events and the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data and C) to examine the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data. Methodology: This study utilized retrospective data, utilizing the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) collected from Somalia between January and November 2024. Data analysis was conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software and Excel spreadsheets to generate percentages, charts, tables, and statistical conclusions pertinent to the study objectives. The researcher applied descriptive analysis to summarize statistics and employed inferential analysis, including correlation and regression analysis, to evaluate the association and effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia. Result: The study identified a correlation coefficient of 0.109 between the number of political events and the number of fatalities. This indicates a very weak positive correlation, suggesting a slight tendency for fatalities to increase as the number of political events rises. The p-value (significance level) for this correlation is 0.750. The findings of the study also reveal that regional variations elucidate the complex interactions between political events and fatalities. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policymakers and researchers, as it highlights the need for tailored approaches in conflict resolution and governance. Recommendation: The study recommends that, given the findings from both regression and correlation analyses, political events alone do not sufficiently account for conflict-related fatalities. Therefore, it is advised that national planners and humanitarian organizations implement comprehensive risk assessments. Additionally, the study underscores the necessity of disaggregating conflict data by region. It is crucial for future research and programs to persist in analyzing data at sub-national levels to discern significant trends and enable geographically specific interventions. Conclusion: In conclusion, this study underscores the importance of transcending the simplistic assumption that increased political activity inherently leads to heightened violence. It advocates for the implementation of context-specific approaches, which consider regional dynamics, local governance structures, traditional conflict resolution methods, and other essential socio-political factors.

Keywords. political violence, demonstrations, conflict dynamics, ACLED data

1. Introduction

Political violence does not manifest uniformly across the globe. Such events can differ in their forms, scale, the individuals or groups involved, and their intended targets [1]. Political theorists often disagree on the exact definition of political violence, as various perspectives and methodologies are typically involved in attempts to define it. These differing viewpoints are challenging to reconcile due to the concept's inherently flexible and sometimes elusive nature. One significant issue with the concept, aside from its general ambiguity, is its tendency to encompass a broad array of unrelated factors [2]. Another challenge arises when trying to distinguish violence that is specifically 'political' from other forms of violence. Making such a distinction requires first identifying the specific political nature of an action, a task that is itself problematic and lacks widespread agreement. Additionally, the diverse terminology used to describe the same range and types of factors associated with political violence further contributes to the term's increasing vagueness and highlights the existing lack of consensus on the topic. Each term or phrase used in the study of political violence tends to emphasize a particular aspect of the concept, often reflecting specific subjective preferences, whether positive or negative [2].

The approach that views political violence more favorably highlights its legitimacy and its role in restoring balance within a social system. Advocates of this perspective argue that political violence is often a necessary reaction to an already unbalanced social structure and is generally seen as beneficial and acceptable. Conversely, the less favorable perspective emphasizes that political violence typically disrupts balance and is considered illegitimate within the broader social framework [2]. This viewpoint suggests that violence not only undermines existing social order and stability but also occurs outside legal norms and is disapproved of by the majority. Additionally, both perspectives on political violence tend to attribute blame to a specific source. In this context, violence is seen as originating either from the governing authority (the incumbents) or from popular movements (the insurgents) opposing the government. Those who view political violence positively often believe that the governing authority is the source of violence, while those with a negative view tend to blame the misguided or subversive elements of the population for disturbing the status quo [2]. Political violence primarily serves a symbolic purpose, with its cultural and emotional impacts outweighing the physical destruction it causes. Research on social movements has highlighted the significance of cultural dynamics in the emergence of political violence, examining both the internal and external aspects of radical groups [3].

Looking at another angle violent event is characterized by an occurrence at a particular place and time, where the direct use of armed force leads to at least one death [4]. John Keane characterizes violence as a specific kind of interaction between human beings, where physical actions result in harm to others [5]. Violence, in its various manifestations, impacts not only the personal growth of those involved but also the broader unity of society [6].

Demonstrations is a revised edition of the initial La Manifestation, featuring a new conclusion that offers an extensive analysis of protests that have taken place globally since its first release. Demonstrations are now acknowledged as a form of political action by both participants and their intended audiences, including political figures, employers, and the general public. As a means of political expression, demonstrations cover a broad, though not limitless, array of practices that are standardized and have become routine, yet they are historically

shaped, culturally bounded, and continually changing. Essentially an urban occurrence, demonstrations are linked to the development of the street as a center for political protest. Although demonstrations have existed as long as cities have, their modern form only emerged in the last century, following a functional and structural transformation. In the early 1800s, streets were still vibrant environments, somewhat private spaces belonging to the lower classes, in contrast to the confined areas of bourgeois residences [7].

Every demonstration fundamentally consists of four key components. Firstly, it requires the temporary use of an open area, which can be either public, like a street, or private, such as a shopping center or hotel lobby. This criterion excludes various types of meetings and gatherings. Secondly, there is the element of expression. The core feature of any demonstration, both for those involved and for the onlookers, is the expression of social demands, which may be more or less defined, through the visible assertion of a group that may or may not already be established. This second element allows us to rule out diverse assemblies lacking a common purpose, such as a crowd of shoppers on market day or a flash mob, as well as political activities meant to be discreet or secretive. It is closely tied to the first element, as an open location is essential for outward expression [7].

The number of participants. Due to its collective nature, a demonstration necessitates a minimum number of participants. Since it is impossible to sociologically determine the smallest group that can act collectively, setting an arbitrary limit is pointless. This observation aims to highlight the need to differentiate between demonstrations and various individual forms of political action, while acknowledging the fluid boundary between them. The political aspect of the demonstration. This final criterion is both challenging and crucial. Is there a sociologically valid criterion, or should we accept the meaning participants attribute to their actions? Many events that initially seem non-political can indicate a sociopolitical crisis or serve as a platform for its expression, as evidenced in numerous studies on hooliganism and suburban riots⁶, and more unexpectedly, in the politicization of festive parades. Therefore, for now, let us assume that demonstrations must express or lead to demands of a political or social nature [7].

Demonstrations serve as a crucial negotiation tool for those challenging authoritarian regimes. Whether opposition leaders organize these mass movements themselves or depend on students and civil society groups, they gain advantages from such activities. Public acts of resistance can undermine the legitimacy of those in power both domestically and internationally, thereby bolstering the opposition's position. In fact, the violence that often accompanies police-monitored protests, whether anticipated or not, becomes intertwined in the political contest between current leaders and opposition figures seeking to garner support on both national and global stages [8].

Protests occur outside the usual avenues for expressing political views, which means authorities do not regulate them in the same manner as elections. Since these established channels have a lower barrier for engagement, it is significantly less probable that participation will lead to a harsh response from the government, even when there are conflicting interests, due to the structured rules in place. Consequently, participating in protests is viewed as a more demanding form of political action [9].

In their work, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Miall and his co-authors discuss how the dynamics of conflict involve the evolving patterns of interaction between opposing parties over time, influenced by changes in structure, behavior, and attitudes. Conflict is dynamic, adapting as parties react to each other's actions, shifts in power, and external interventions [10]. Grasping these dynamics is crucial for understanding the evolving nature of political violence

and protests in Somalia, how actors react to state repression or economic challenges, and how localized events can escalate into broader unrest.

In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of protests occurring across Africa. These demonstrations are predominantly found in cities, which are considered particularly vulnerable to collective actions of dissent. Nonetheless, there is a significant variation in the occurrence of urban protests, both among different countries and within various urban areas of the same country [11]. What factors lead to some urban regions experiencing more protests than others? Studies examining the factors that drive protest mobilization have largely focused on three theoretical frameworks to explain the motivations, resources, and opportunities that facilitate protests. The grievance-based perspective suggests that disparities between groups create perceptions of injustice, which are then framed and politicized by social leaders to rally individuals. Proponents of resource mobilization theory contend that grievances alone are insufficient to incite protests; leaders must also gather enough resources to address collective action challenges. Lastly, political opportunity theories highlight the elements of a political system that influence the likelihood of mobilization by affecting the cost-benefit analysis of those involved [11].

Over the past year, political and social demonstrations have drawn significant attention across Africa. In Ethiopia, widespread protests erupted in the Oromia and Amhara regions due to grievances related to political marginalization. In South Africa, student protests over tuition fees and demands to 'decolonize' universities have been widespread and persistent, causing major disruptions to the academic calendar and resulting in property damage. Additionally, contentious electoral processes led to protests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, and Uganda. Even nations like Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe, which typically experience limited protests due to strict control over public spaces, have seen significant public unrest [12]. In North Africa, Algeria has experienced significant violence, primarily due to the actions of three groups opposing the Algerian government: the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These violent Islamist organizations were responsible for 93% of the 12,050 deaths in Algeria [13].

Although the recent surge is significant, Africa has a longstanding tradition of large-scale street protests. Colonial authorities encountered resistance from national liberation movements, alongside strikes by labor unions and demonstrations by marginalized urban communities. Following independence, political protests and economic strikes persisted sporadically, fueled by dissatisfaction with one-party dominance and authoritarian regimes, as well as deteriorating economic conditions and harsh austerity policies. Protests became particularly prominent in the late 1980s and 1990s, and they are credited with contributing to a democratic transition across the continent [12].

Throughout Nigeria's political history, uprisings against the government have been a recurring theme. The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Republics, along with the sporadic military takeovers, have witnessed numerous violent protests, demonstrations, secessionist movements, and insurgencies, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives and significant property damage. Various strategies, such as militarization, inquiries, legal actions, and negotiations, have been employed to suppress these uprisings, achieving varying levels of success [14]. Research indicates that poor leadership results in the exclusion of the general populace from accessing state resources, while misguided political involvement has led to violent actions. Numerous conflicts in Nigeria, driven by socio-political factors, have been backed by economic and political elites who aim to maintain control over state mechanisms. They recruit foot

soldiers from the ranks of unemployed youth, impoverished adults, and ethnic extremists. Resorting to force to address legitimate grievances has not yielded the desired outcomes. Consequently, the state needs to adopt dialogue as a non-confrontational approach with the disillusioned masses [14].

The nature of armed conflicts has undergone significant transformation since the end of the Cold War [15]. In theory, political unrest can be traced back to a set of fundamental causes that fall into two primary categories. The first category involves grievances, which include political repression and economic hardship. The second category involves opportunity structures, such as demographic makeup and urbanization, which facilitate mobilization. Although the main factors contributing to unrest in this study are assessed at the subnational level, they frequently interact with broader institutional factors that change over time, leading to political instability [16].

Throughout history, events of unrest have triggered profound societal and cultural transformations. For instance, the wave of dissatisfaction that began in France in 1848 quickly spread across much of Europe and parts of Latin America. Similarly, the United States experienced a series of urban racial riots during the 1960s [17]. In 1989, numerous central and eastern European nations witnessed uprisings against communism, epitomized by the Berlin Wall's collapse. More recently, the Arab world has seen rapid social instability, ranging from peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt that dismantled long-standing authoritarian regimes to a protest movement in Libya that escalated into a full-scale civil war. These instances of social unrest encompass a wide range of conflicts, from civil wars, revolutions, and coups d'état that have resulted in millions of deaths, to relatively peaceful internal conflicts like anti-government demonstrations, riots, and general strikes [17].

The study is guided by two theories: greed and grievance theory, and relative deprivation theory. After World War II, sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer (1900-1960) is recognized for formulating the theory of relative deprivation. This theory suggests that feelings of deprivation and dissatisfaction are linked to a desired reference point, often referred to as reference groups. Such feelings emerge when aspirations transform into legitimate expectations, but societal barriers prevent their fulfillment [18]. In contrast, social satisfaction is the antithesis of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is widely regarded as a key factor in understanding social movements, as it explains the drive for social change that fuels these movements. Social movements often arise from collective experiences of relative deprivation. When institutional avenues for addressing grievances are weak or nonexistent, relative deprivation can escalate from peaceful protests to organized political violence. For instance, in certain areas, militant or clan-based violence may stem from enduring perceptions of economic and political marginalization [18].

The greed versus grievance model emerged as an economic framework to comprehend the origins of civil wars, largely linked to certain economic limitations. Collier and Hoeffler differentiate between greed and grievance as conflict drivers by assigning distinct proxy indicators to each concept. The model posits that economic factors (greed-based explanations) are more crucial in elucidating the causes of civil wars than politically driven factors (grievance-based explanations) [19].

When greed is considered a motive for civil unrest, the model connects the causes of rebellions and civil wars to the presence of "opportunity," which is interpreted as greed. These opportunities can be categorized into three main aspects: recruitment, geography, and financing. The Greed and Grievance Theory offers a valuable perspective for understanding the dynamics of political violence and protests by framing them as results of both economic incentives and

deep-seated injustices. According to this theory, individuals or groups may resort to violence due to "greed"—the quest for wealth, power, or resources—or "grievance"—a reaction to perceived political, ethnic, or economic marginalization [19].

Located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia has faced intricate political dynamics and ongoing challenges in its efforts to build a stable state. The nation has been shaped by decades of political turmoil, armed conflicts, and the lack of a strong central government, making it one of the most difficult cases for contemporary state-building. Grasping the complex interaction of political forces and the hurdles in creating a functional state is essential to understanding Somalia's present circumstances and considering possible routes to stability and prosperity [20]. Somalia, among the most impoverished nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, continues to encounter numerous difficulties due to its ongoing fragility [21].

The historical backdrop of Somalia's colonial era, followed by a chaotic post-independence period, has greatly impacted the country's political environment. The state's collapse in 1991, following the removal of President Siad Barre, triggered a destructive civil war that enabled various armed factions and warlords to take control of different areas, deepening political divisions and obstructing efforts to form a unified government. Somalia has long been recognized for its volatile political history and ongoing challenges to state-building. The nation has endured prolonged conflicts, clan rivalries, and a fragile central government that has impeded the creation of a stable and effective state. This article provides an overview of the political dynamics and state-building efforts in Somalia, highlighting the complexities and challenges the country faces in its pursuit of stability and governance [20]. The Somali population has endured extended periods of oppression and violence inflicted by their people. They have faced challenging and severe living conditions under both democratic and military governments. To put it differently, in Somalia, for example, years of turmoil, conflict, and instability have left the current generation with significant psychological scars. Approximately two-thirds of the Somali population, consisting of young people, encounter obstacles in their transition to adulthood due to various social, economic, and political exclusions [22]. During the democratic period from 1960 to 1969, the newfound independence and the creation of state institutions did not fulfill the public's expectations. Poverty levels rose, and security worsened. Additionally, state institutions were plagued by corruption, nepotism, and cronyism [23].

Despite the growing body of research on political violence and demonstrations globally and within Africa, significant research gaps remain, particularly concerning Somalia. Firstly, there is a paucity of data-driven studies focusing specifically on Somalia. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project provides valuable event-level data; however, few researchers have systematically employed this dataset to analyze the patterns, causes, and participants in political violence and demonstrations in Somalia. Secondly, the existing literature often treats political violence and demonstrations as separate phenomena, resulting in a lack of integrated analysis that could reveal the relationship between political events and fatalities specific to the context of Somalia, as well as presenting regional disparities. Therefore, this study will focus on covering those gaps, specifically looking the comparison of regional variations in the number of political events and associated fatalities in Somalia, assessing the correlation between the number of political events and the number of fatalities and the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data.

2. Objectives of the study

- To compare regional variations in the number of political events and associated fatalities in Somalia from January to November 2024 using ACLED data.

- To assess the correlation between the number of political events and the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data.
- To examine the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data.

3. Methodology of the study (materials and methods)

Retrospective data were used in this study. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) will be used; the study will specifically use data collected between January and November 2024 from Somalia.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) is a comprehensive dataset that systematically compiles reported information on internal political conflicts, categorized by date, location, and involved actors. ACLED gathers and categorizes reported data on political violence in developing countries, concentrating on civil and communal conflicts, violence targeting civilians, remote violence, and incidents of rioting and protesting. ACLED documents violent events occurring both within and outside the framework of a civil war, with particular attention to violence against civilians, interactions involving militias, communal conflicts, and riots [24].

The dataset was in Excel format and contained information on the study variables (political events and fatalities). The researcher conducted comprehensive data cleaning prior to data analysis, which involved checking for missing values, duplicates, completeness, relevance, and redundancy. There were no missing values, duplicates, or redundancies. Consequently, the dataset was deemed suitable for statistical analysis.


The **Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)** software and Excel spreadsheet were used for data analysis to generate percentages, charts, tables, and statistical conclusions that address the study objectives. The researcher employed descriptive analysis to present a summary of statistics, frequencies, and percentages, and inferential analysis of correlation to assess the association between the type of political events and fatalities. Additionally, regression analysis was used to evaluate the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia.

4. Analysis and results of the study

To compare regional variations in the number of political events and associated fatalities in Somalia from January to November 2024 using ACLED data.

This objective examines the variations in the occurrence of political events and related fatalities across different regions in Somalia from January to November 2024, utilizing data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) as presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Regional variations for political events and associated fatalities.



The chart above displays the number of political events and the number of fatalities across various regions in Somalia. Regions like Awdal and Bakool have a significant number of political events but relatively low fatalities. This could indicate effective conflict resolution mechanisms, community engagement, or stability that prevents violence despite a high frequency of political activity. In regions such as Hiran both the number of political events and fatalities are high. This suggests a volatile environment where political events may escalate tensions, leading to violence and fatalities. It could also reflect ongoing conflict or instability that results in casualties.

In regions like Togdheer and Sool, there are fewer political events but a relatively high number of fatalities. This could imply underlying issues such as long-standing grievances, tribal conflicts, or security challenges that result in violence, even without frequent political mobilization. The chart illustrates that regional dynamics can significantly impact the relationship between political events and fatalities. Areas with frequent political engagement do not always correlate with higher fatalities, suggesting that context matters. Factors like governance, local culture, law enforcement, and community resilience play crucial roles.

In conclusion, the analysis of regional variations elucidates the intricate interactions between political events and fatalities. Understanding these dynamics is essential for policymakers and researchers, as it underscores the necessity for tailored approaches in conflict resolution and governance. The researcher suggests that further qualitative research could yield deeper insights into the underlying causes of these observed patterns.

To assess the correlation between the number of political events and the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data (Pearson Correlation analysis).

This objective presents an empirical analysis to evaluate the association between the number of political events and the number of fatalities in Somalia, utilizing data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Determining if there is a statistically significant association between these two factors can shed light on the severity and human toll of political violence in the region. A Pearson correlation analysis is used to evaluate the association between the number of political events and fatalities.

		Number of Political Events	Number of Fatalities
Number of Political Events	Pearson Correlation	1	.109
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.750
	N	11	11
Number of Fatalities	Pearson Correlation	.109	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.750	
	N	11	11

Based on Table 2 above, the correlation coefficient between the number of political events and the number of fatalities is 0.109. This indicates a very weak positive correlation, suggesting that there is a slight tendency for fatalities to increase as the number of political events increases. The p-value (significance level) for the correlation is 0.750. This value is much higher than the common threshold of 0.05, indicating that the correlation is not statistically significant. In other words, we cannot conclude that there is a meaningful relationship between these two variables based on this data.

In conclusion, the correlation between the number of political events and the number of fatalities is weak (0.109) and not statistically significant ($p = 0.750$). This suggests that there is no reliable evidence to support a relationship between these variables in the given dataset. Other factors may be influencing fatalities that are not captured by the number of political events.

To examine the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia using ACLED data (regression analysis).

This objective assesses the effect of the number of political events on the number of fatalities in Somalia, utilizing ACLED data from January to November 2024. Through the application of regression analysis, the study aims to ascertain the degree to which variations in the occurrence of political events affect the number of fatalities.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.109 ^a	.012	-.098	135.597
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Political Events				

Table 3 above, "Model Summary," presents key statistics for a regression analysis involving one predictor variable: the number of political events. Overall, the results show that

the number of political events has little to no effect on the dependent variable, as evidenced by the very low R Square (0.012) and the negative Adjusted R Square (-0.098).

Table 4: ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1992.776	1	1992.776	.108	.750 ^b
	Residual	165479.770	9	18386.641		
	Total	167472.545	10			

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Fatalities
b. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Political Events

The ANOVA table provides insights into the relationship between the predictor (number of political events) and the dependent variable (number of fatalities). The ANOVA results indicate that the model, which includes the number of political events as a predictor, does not significantly explain the variability in the number of fatalities. The high p-value (0.750) and a low F-statistic (0.108) signal that the predictor does not have a meaningful impact on the outcome.

Table 5: Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	339.020	358.772		.945	.369
	Number of Political Events	.444	1.348	.109	.329	.750

a. Dependent Variable: Number of Fatalities

According to Table 5 above, the regression analysis shows that the **number of political events is not a statistically significant predictor** of the number of fatalities in Somalia based on this model and dataset. The high p-values ($p = 0.750$) and low Beta (0.109) suggest that **other factors may be driving fatalities**, and that political event frequency alone does **not explain much variance** in fatalities during the studied period.

5. Discussion

The results of this study underscore the complex and uneven distribution of political violence across different regions in Somalia. Between January and November 2024, some areas, like Awdal, experienced a notable number of political events but had relatively few deaths. This finding aligns with another study, "Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)," which indicates that Awdal saw 18 incidents with no resulting fatalities [25].

Examining the correlation between political events and fatalities reveals a negligible and statistically insignificant relationship. Essentially, the occurrence of numerous political events in a region does not inherently lead to increased violence. This conclusion is further supported by regression analysis, which indicates that the frequency of political events does not significantly predict the number of fatalities. This underscores the necessity of acknowledging the unique context and challenges of each region, as universal solutions prove ineffective. The

factors influencing events in one area may differ entirely from those in another. Therefore, it is imperative for policymakers, researchers, and peacebuilders to go beyond statistical data and closely examine the specific circumstances of each region. Conducting more detailed, local-level research—particularly by incorporating the perspectives and experiences of the communities involved—could yield insights into the true causes of conflict and lead to more effective, tailored strategies for fostering peace and safeguarding lives.

6. Recommendations

Given the findings and analysis demonstrated above, the study suggests the following recommendations:

- Considering the differences in the number of fatalities in regions with similar levels of political activity (for instance, Awdal experiences many events but few fatalities, whereas Hiran has a high number of fatalities), it is crucial for stakeholders to customize peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies to fit the unique circumstances of each region. Programs that are sensitive to conflict must take into account the historical, social, and governance factors that vary from one region to another.
- Quantitative data indicates that the frequency of political events does not have a significant impact on predicting fatalities. Therefore, it is suggested that further qualitative studies be conducted to investigate other possible factors, such as clan conflicts, weapon availability, governance deficiencies, youth exclusion, or external influences, which might contribute to fatalities independently of how often political events occur.
- Areas like Togdheer and Sool, which experience high death rates regardless of the number of incidents, need specialized early warning systems and enhanced local security strategies. Surveillance tools should be capable of identifying tensions that could lead to violence, even when political activities appear minimal.
- Given that both regression and correlation analyses reveal that political events alone cannot fully account for fatalities related to conflict, it is essential for national planners and humanitarian organizations to utilize comprehensive risk assessments. These assessments should incorporate factors such as governance quality, service provision, socio-economic pressures, and relationships between communities.
- Enhancing inclusive and accountable governance, along with bolstering community resilience, can help prevent political situations from turning into violent conflicts. Initiatives should focus on supporting dialogue platforms, engaging youth, providing conflict resolution training, and fostering trust between citizens and government officials.
- The research highlights the significance of breaking down conflict data by region. Future studies and programs need to continue examining data at sub-national levels to identify significant trends and enable geographically specific interventions.

7. Conclusion

To sum up, this study highlights the necessity of moving past the simplistic notion that increased political activity automatically results in heightened violence. It promotes the adoption of approaches tailored to specific contexts, taking into account regional dynamics, local governance frameworks, traditional methods of conflict resolution, and other fundamental socio-political elements. The study's conclusions emphasize the need for further comprehensive, mixed-methods research to identify the root causes of conflict-related deaths

and to develop more effective, evidence-based strategies for peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Somalia.

Conflict of interest.

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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