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Dreaming of the peaceful ways: An evaluation of the Indonesian deradicalisation program

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Abstract. The Indonesian deradicalization program conducted by Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) comes under public scrutiny due the number of terrorist recidivism with a total of 47 individuals during 2018 until 2020. This indicates that the ongoing deradicalization program has not been successful and effective and it requires a massive change across all levels. This article aims to analyse the Indonesian deradicalization programs which has been adopting the peacemaking criminology approach and how it is implemented. Employing a qualitative study through desk research and informal interviews as the data collection techniques, this article examines various problems and challenges that are hampering the peacemaking-based deradicalization programs in Indonesia, including the problem of database on the ex-convicts, methods of approach and assessment, reliance on the top-down approach conducted by government institutions, pandemic challenges, and inconsistencies with the legal or judicial aspects. Adapting to the social change approach by including the involvement of the non-government stakeholders is important for deradicalization program to work. This article recommends that the evaluation of deradicalization policies in Indonesia should consider the re-focusing of deradicalization goals by aiming at behavioural changes rather than mindset and ideological changes, incorporating gender aspects in deradicalization programs, research-based programs formulation based on intersecting multidiscipline research fields and the possibility for the deradicalization as well as disengagement privatization programs to increase the effectiveness and reduce inefficiency.

Keywords. Deradicalization; Counterterrorism; Indonesia; Peacemaking Criminology; Change

Introduction

Terrorism still poses as a serious problem for many countries in the world, including Indonesia. Globally, terrorism acts were at its highest point in in 2014 with 33.000 fatalities recorded in a year (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). Scholars and practitioners in terrorism field have attempted to define terrorism and fails to agree on a single definition. In short, the underlying tenet of terrorism is that it aims to achieve a political goal by using violent means and creating fear and potentially resulting in the loss of lives and wellbeing of the innocent victims (Ghosh, 2014 p.91). The combination between various factors behind its occurrence and its massive destructive impacts have put terrorism as a complex criminal as well as political act.

Recently, women and children have been involved as perpetrators in some terrorism

attacks across the globe. Although women's involvement in terrorism has existed for centuries, the world started to pay attention to women's involvement since 1985 in Lebanon suicide bombing. Up to the present day, it is recorded that casualties resulting from women's acts of terror have reached more 3,000 people globally. A total of 6,902 women were recorded to have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria during the period 2013 to 2019 (Institute for Economic & Peace, 2019). Children have also been involved in terrorism acts and United Nations noted that throughout 2015 there were 274 cases of children joining the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria (UNODC, 2017, page 1). A report by IPAC (2021) mentioned that the Indonesian authorities recorded a total of 1,276 Indonesian citizens are currently detained or living in displaced camps in Syria and Iraq, with 297 of them have been verified as owning Indonesian passports. From this data, it is estimated that the number of Indonesian women currently in Syria and Iraq is 689 people. Meanwhile, the number of Indonesian children as of 2021 is higher than it was in 2015, that accounts for 333 children with 236 children are under 10 years (IPAC, 2021). Meanwhile, the trend of women's involvement in militant terrorist groups in Southeast Asia showed an increase during the period 2014 to 2019 especially in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, with a total of 115 women (Jadoon, et al, 2020).

Indonesia has been battling the threat of terrorism since its independence. Throughout the period of 2018 to 2020 there were 49 terrorist attacks or acts occurred in Indonesia, with 21 attacks in 2018, 15 attacks in 2019, and 13 attacks in 2020. During those three years, Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) group dominated the incidences with 21 attacks, followed by MIT (East Indonesia Mujahidin) with 11 acts and the rest were conducted by other affiliated groups (BNPT, 2021). Indonesian women also played an active role in acts of terror, as suicide bombers, financiers, recruiters, and other supporting roles. Until 2020, there are 39 female terrorist convicts in Indonesian prisons (IPAC, 2020) and there was a total of 6 Indonesian women committed suicide attacks as of 2021. This shows that the presence of perpetrators and former terrorists living in Indonesian society is inevitable. Furthermore, the development of communication and information technology has contributed to the increasing acts of terrorism due to the massive online propaganda and recruitment process conducted by the terrorist groups.

Terrorism has always been identified with severe punishment because terrorism is a crime against humanity and its act results in massive victims that the state often imposes death or life sentences to the perpetrators. However, the legal approach and hard-security approach in counterterrorism does not necessarily create a deterrence effect and prevent the possibility of re-action in the future (Sumarwoto et al, 2020). Presently, the effectiveness of the law enforcements' methods in addressing terrorism acts is questionable because it is deemed as unsuccessful in preventing terrorist acts. This has motivated experts to introduce the concept of peacemaking in counterterrorism efforts. BNPT started to adopt peacemaking as an alternative approach to implement the soft approach countering terrorism strategy. Soft approach in counterterrorism focuses on solving problems or conflicts in a comprehensive and persuasive manners as well as prioritizing humanitarian aspects (Bakti, 2014, pp. 13-14).

Presidential Decree No. 46 of 2010 is the basis for the implementation of the BNPT's deradicalization program as a part of the soft approach strategy. The government's authority on deradicalization under BNPT's leadership is explained further in the Article 43A paragraph 3 of Law no. 5 of 2018 of Counter Terrorism Act which states that deradicalization is a priority agenda for the national strategy in countering terrorism. Deradicalization aims to change the mindset of the terrorist convicts and their family members from radical to non-radical or efforts to moderate their previous hard-line views (Abu Bakar, 2015). Deradicalization necessitates the government officials to treat detainees based on humanistic values to create a bond of mutual trust and prevent a sense of revenge stemming from law enforcement procedures such as arrests

and prosecutions of those who have committed or planned to commit acts of terrors.

Deradicalization focuses on the motivational re-orientation, re-education, resocialization programs, coupled with social and economic empowerment program in order to reduce inequalities felt by those who are formerly involved in terrorism, including sympathizers. The ultimate goal of deradicalization is to create a sense of nationalism so that the targets participants will be willing to fully participate and function as the parts of the Indonesian society (Golose, 2010). Several academic literatures have attempted to define deradicalization, such as an effort to cast doubts regarding an ideology (Nilsson, 2021), a substantial change for the transformation of ideology and attitudes (Muhammad & Hiariej, 2021), a cognitive shift and level of ideological control (Horgan, Meredith, & Papatheodorou, 2020), and a process in which radicalized individuals slowly (re)process and eventually abandon extremist views (Baaken, Korn, Ruf, Walkenhorst, 2020). In the Indonesian context, the implementation of deradicalization has involved the roles of CSOs in mitigating the shortcomings of government-sponsored deradicalization programs (Agastia et al, 2020). However, the implementation of deradicalization programs also faces various challenges and unintended consequences that lead to ineffectiveness that requires an alternative approach such as the humanitarian activities (Ilyas & Athwal, 2021).

To date, the Indonesian deradicalization program is still considered as the main strategy to reduce the number of future terrorism crimes. This is in line with peacemaking criminology approach which believes that individual transformation is the most efficient way to bring about societal transformation (Wozniak, 2002; Trombley, 2019). A similar principle applies to the deradicalization program which underlies that the changing in radical groups' ideology is one of the most important avenues to be achieved in reducing the incidences of terrorism in the future.

Nevertheless, deradicalization programs have been highly criticized in terms of effectiveness, transparency, sustainability, and efficiency. The Indonesian deradicalization by BNPT comes under public scrutiny due the number of terrorist recidivism with a total of 47 individuals during 2018 until 2020. This indicates that the ongoing deradicalization program has not been successful and effective and it requires a massive change across all levels. A recent petition signed by hundreds of ex-convicts sought for BNPT's dismissal demonstrates the growing public disappointments towards BNPT's deradicalization programs (Liputan 6 news, 2021; Media Indonesia, 2021; Metro Central Sulawesi, 2021). BNPT's non-transparent and unsustainable selection process for convicts who would participate in deradicalization program had also been a subject of criticism. Some convicts and ex-convicts had only undergone the initial identification process without ever reaching to the program realization. Approaching terrorism suspects, convicts and ex-convicts has always been a difficult task and requires creativity and special interpersonal skills. It requires empathy and high patience, the skills that are impossible to acquire in a short time among all the deradicalization officers. All these reasons have led to general assumption that the deradicalization program which have been based on a non-violent approach seems too slow and shows minimal progress.

This article aims to review the implementation of Indonesian deradicalization program which had adopted the peacemaking criminology approach in mainstreaming the peaceful means to control terrorism crimes. This article evaluates the implementation of the deradicalization program which has been criticized due to the emergence of recidivism cases of former terrorism convicts and extremists' group supporters who have completed the deradicalization programs. This study attempts to fill in the research gaps in the evaluation and monitoring of deradicalization programs in Indonesia by highlighting recent challenges and emphasizing the need to adopt a new approach in its implementation. In particular, this article

aims to answer why and how the peacemaking criminology approach behind Indonesian deradicalization has not been successful in meeting its purposes.

Methodology

This study employs qualitative approach through conducting a literature review of the primary and secondary data source and informal interviews as the data collection methods. Extensive desk study is suitable for this article because it supports the authors' efforts to evaluate a deradicalization program in countering terrorism field and test the accuracy of the peacemaking approach implemented in deradicalization programs (Tranfield et al., 2003 in Snyder, 2019). The authors rely on several sources such as books, journal articles, news in mainstream media and reports or published as well as unpublished documents from BNPT on the deradicalization program implementation in Indonesia. Subsequently, the authors conducted informal interviews with 3 (three) BNPT deradicalization officers to confirm empirical constraints and explore deeper aspects related to the implementation of the ongoing deradicalization program, especially challenges and difficulties. In this context, informal or unstructured interview is an interview without relying on pre-prepared questions guidance (Jamshed, 2014; Given, 2008). This method of data collection allows the authors to be more flexible during the conversations thereby giving higher possibility to gain trust from the interviewees to share their most challenging experiences.

Policy analysis is employed in this article combined with peacemaking criminology conceptual framework to assess and evaluate the existing deradicalization program in Indonesia. This is because Indonesian deradicalization program have adapted the basic principles of peacemaking criminology, including its aim as an alternative effort to tackle/reduce crime rate through non-violent ways. It also intends to involve multi-stakeholders across the whole range of deradicalization efforts such as rehabilitation, reintegration, and re-socialisation.

Result and Discussion

Peacemaking Criminology in Indonesian Deradicalization Program

Deradicalization is an effort to eradicate and eliminate individual's radical thinking by fostering an understanding of religious values that are inclusive, friendly, moderate, and peaceful within the framework of diversity and pluralism, so that they are willing to accept differences with a sense of justice (Subagyo, 2021). Deradicalization shares similar characteristics with some of the peacemaking approach elements. Peacemaking approach offers alternative problem-solving options to stop violence by employing conciliation, mediation, and dispute resolution responses (Lanier & Henry, 2004). The implementation of policies based on peacemaking approach takes consideration of the relationship between social structure, crime, social harms, the criminal justice system as well as peacemaking alternatives (Wozniak, 2002).

As a series of programs aimed at dealing with radicalism that leads to violent extremism, the deradicalization program requires the collaboration of various stakeholders, including government institutions, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, and the program's participants (Muhammad & Hiariej, 2020). This is in line with the principle of the peacemaking approach that underlines the important roles of each element in creating peace (McEvoy, 2003). Within Indonesian counterterrorism strategy, the deradicalization is claimed as the most effective formula in eliminating, reducing, and reversing terrorist extremist ideology towards more mainstream teachings through peaceful means and by promoting empathy. Initiated by Indonesian National Police (INP), deradicalization has been conducted in Indonesia since 2005 and it was partially studied and developed by the INP. After BNPT's official establishment, deradicalization program falls within the BNPT's authority who is then

collaborating with relevant ministries/agencies to actively participate in this program. The peacemaking-based research and empathetic approach became the initial agenda of the deradicalization program by looking at the broad spectrum of factors behind terrorists' radicalization to violent extremism. It is because the efforts to deter future terrorist crimes takes account not only the severe punishment, but also on measuring the impacts in order to design better rehabilitation and remedy plans (Bazemore, 2009).

Law Number 5 of 2018 on Counter Terrorism stipulated that there are two types of deradicalization programs: the inside-prison deradicalization and outside-prison deradicalization. The first program targets terrorist actors in jails starting from their first entry as suspects, defendants, until prosecuted as convicts. Some stages for this program include: 1) identification and assessment 2) rehabilitation through counselling and focus group dialogue, 3) re-education through religious mentoring and development, 4) nationalism and civic education, 5) character education and 6) conflict management. Prior to the convicts' release, the social reintegration process marks the beginning of the outside-prison program involving all stakeholders in the detention centres as well as the outside-prison deradicalization officers. By and large, this program does not only target ex-terrorists, but also "suspected communities" surrounding the ex-convict's environment such as their immediate family members. The program begins with identification and assessment process and the maximum duration of this outside-prison program is 30 days after the completion of individuals' serving time. For "suspected communities" or those who may be exposed to violent extremist ideology but have not yet committed terror acts, the outside-prison program will be conducted based on intelligence information gathered through the Indonesian Intelligence Community. All participants of outside-prison programs go through nationalism and civic education classes, religious mentoring activities and entrepreneurship programs.

Figure 1. Deradicalization Program Scheme in Indonesia

Source: Authors' summary from Law Number 5 of 2018 on Counter Terrorism

BNPT Deradicalization Blueprint (2015) mentions that the implementation of the deradicalization program is carried out through several approaches, namely religious, psychological, socio-cultural, economic, legal, political, and technological approaches. The same document states that all deradicalization programs and activities aim at fostering and empowering terrorist convicts, ex-convicts, their families, and the community. Coaching and empowerment aims to empower and assist the terrorist convicts, ex-convicts, their families, and their networks to be able to re-socialize with society. This program's main goal is to develop individuals' mental, emotional, and social capabilities so they can live normally within the society. This coaching approach consists of religious, personality, and entrepreneurship development. This section will briefly discuss the religious and entrepreneurship development as the two most important activities under the framework of BNPT's deradicalization program.

First, religious development is an effort to assist its participants in building a comprehensive religious understanding and replacing the radical belief or ideology to a non-radical mindset through interdisciplinary approaches such as religious, social, and cultural (Tukina, 2011, pp. 731-742). This program aims to remove radical and violent ideology and create the inclusive, peaceful, and tolerant ideological orientation. Coaching is conducted through dialogue and a persuasive approach to incite willingness and awareness in rejecting the violent beliefs.

The main challenge of religious development is that it heavily relies on the involvement of various third parties which makes it hard to trace the progress and evaluate its effectiveness. On the other hand, the increase in the number of deradicalization officers in prisons has not been accompanied by an increase in religious counter-narratives expertise. Counter-narrative skills in responding to religious arguments and doctrines that are often misused by extremist groups are crucial for the deradicalization officers for two reasons. First, it helps them in achieving the target of removing the extremist ideology. Secondly, it is their "shields" against the radical beliefs frequently imposed by highly radicalized convicts towards everyone who interacts with them. There has been a case on the internalization of radical ideology among prison officers successfully carried out by terrorist convicts in Indonesian prisons as has been mentioned publicly by The Indonesian Minister of Law and Human Rights (Kompas, 2016). Without adequate counter-narratives capabilities, these officers are risked being the targets of indoctrination by violent extremists inside the prison. In addition, deradicalization officers also find it difficult to measure the extent to which an individual's religious level has truly achieved the indicators expected in the deradicalization program, because religious development targets a cognitive level which sometimes is not reflected on their behaviours.

Second, entrepreneurship development is an effort to provide practical skills in entrepreneurship which are expected to support themselves and their family economically upon their release. The purpose of this program is to increase the standard of living that can reduce economic disparities by providing easy access to legal incomes. There is empirical evidence that increasing competence and involvement of individuals in legal activities, such as work, can reduce the likelihood of individuals being involved in criminal activities (Machin and Meghir, 2004). This entrepreneurship program offers equal rights for an ex-convict to develop her or his life skills and acquire the opportunity to have a better life (Ishoy & Kruis, 2019, p. 220). This program has been conducted based on the assumption that economic problems are the most important factor underlying a person's involvement in terrorist act.

However, the major challenge of this program lies in the implementation and results of the program which are still far from optimal. The main weakness of this program is the absence of continuous monitoring and evaluation. The approach has been carried out through the provision of financial assistance so that former convicts can build small businesses. With initial

capital value between Rp. 5 million (US \$ 430) and Rp. 10 million (US \$ 900), officers escort ex-convicts to buy materials to start their small businesses, to ensure that the money is not misused. Frequently, financial assistance is given at such short notice and must be used right away that causes perplexity and hesitancy on what to purchase and what things they need. This approach in providing financial assistance is ineffective due to three main factors: 1) a lack of direction on how to use the funds; 2) limited time to consider and determine how funds will be used; and 3) the absence of monitoring after the fund disbursement to the ex-convicts (Sumpter, Wardhani, & Priyanto, 2021). In addition, initial survey on skills and expertise that the participants need and want to explore has often been overlooked, resulting in generalizations that leads to the lack of "sense of belonging" to the trainings and skills that they have received.

Data from BNPT's Directorate of Deradicalization mentions that there has been a significant increase of 196 % to the number outside-prison deradicalization participants in 2021, from a total only 70 in 2020 to 137 individuals in 2021 as seen Figure 2. This number is also higher than the 2019 program which accounted a total of 121. Meanwhile the number participants in inside-prison deradicalization program have been slightly decreasing from 60 in 2020 to 54 in 2021.

Figure 2. Deradicalization Participants Outside and Inside Prisons 2019-2021

Source: BNPT, 2021.

The beneficiaries of these programs are not limited to ex-convicts, but also involve deportants and returnees (those who have not been charged with terrorism offences after attempting to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq) as well as the convicts' families. Some of the programs' intended results has been measured through the sustainable businesses run by ex-convicts as well as pledge of loyalty to the Indonesian state. As an example, Jack Harun, one of the Bali Bombing I perpetrators, has received the government's fund to open a shop in Karanganyar, Central Java and invited former terrorist convicts to join or work in his small

business enterprises (Merdeka.com, 2018). In addition, a pledge ceremony has been conducted to facilitate 34 convicts at the Class IIA Prison in Gunung Sindur who wanted to show their commitments to return to Indonesian state's ideology and abandon extremist ideology (Kompas.com, 2021). In a small scale, these exemplars have been used as the models of successful results from the deradicalization program carried out by BNPT.

Challenges of Indonesian Deradicalization program

The implementation of the deradicalization program faces various challenges, especially related methodology of implementing the program and measuring the level of success. This is in line with the challenges in the peacemaking criminology approach regarding the absence of a detailed blueprint or framework to be implemented in practice (Akers, 2013). As of October 2021, the number of individuals participating in outside-prison deradicalization programs conducted by BNPT is 212 people, with a total of 165 people participating in religious and nationalism and civic education and 127 join the entrepreneurship development program. Meanwhile, the number inside-prison deradicalization participants is 38 persons, with 21 of them join the rehabilitation, 9 of them join the re-education, and 4 people participate in social reintegration 4 program (BNPT, 2021). The decrease in the number of those participating in these programs has been caused by a change in their decisions, as those who initially agreed to join the program, later withdrew their participations.

Additionally, another obstacle to the inside-prison deradicalization program is related to the identification and assessment of convicts participating the programs (BNPT, 2021). In some cases, some convicts are very hard-line that they rejected the assessment process therefore it is difficult to build good relationships and trust between assessors and convicts. This led to the challenges of producing an accurate assessment in identifying and measuring radical understanding from both convicts and their families as well as in determining appropriate interventions and rehabilitation programs. This, in turn, results in the slow and minimal progress on the efforts to develop measuring instruments for these radical individuals.

The current arrears and perpetrators of terror acts turned out to be some former terrorists or terrorist recidivists, their families or relatives as well as the member of their former extremist networks (Subagyo, 2021). There are also those who have completed the terrorism deradicalization program but disappeared and re-joined their old circles such as Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh who committed suicide-bombings in Jolo Church 2019 and Khalid Abu Bakar who recruited the 2018 Surabaya bombers. In addition, recent research shows that upon the completion of deradicalization program, some participants who have moderated their views have returned to embrace violent beliefs after accessing extremist contents from the internet (Nasution in Subagyo, 2021). This is due to the difficulty of predicting their involvement after their release from the prisons. In addition, mapping whether a former terrorist really disengages from his or her former circle or is still waiting for an opportunity to commit a terror act, is also a very complex task to do. Additionally, it is also problematic to rely on recidivism level as an indicator for the success or failure of the deradicalization program because there is no adequate definition related to terrorist recidivism either (Altier, Boyle & Horgan, 2017).

The Covid-19 pandemic has also impacted on deradicalization programs which has to adapt to the virtual implementation methods to prevent the spread of the virus. The online observation stage becomes more difficult as it becomes less valid and unreliable. Nevertheless, rehabilitation, re-education, and social reintegration in the online world deal with various challenges including: 1) The lack of in-dept and intensive discussions due to technical errors such as poor internet connection and sound-system problems; 2) The lack of effective

coordination between the prison officers and other stakeholders especially during the handover of new convicts; 3) Lack of coordination between the central-based ministries/agencies and local governments and 4) The limited and decreasing frequencies of familial visits to prisons in order to support the participants to join deradicalization programs.

The limited involvement of non-government stakeholders and heavy reliance on the top-down approach have been hindering the implementation of the Indonesian deradicalization. This hampered the solid collaboration with the community who has been very influential in the grassroots levels, thereby reducing the significant impact on changing the behaviour and mindset of targeted individuals (Sumpter, 2017). Deradicalization that considers the roles of local stakeholders such as community leaders, civil society, and religious leaders who better understand the problems and dynamics that are specific to their areas will likely to be more effective. Moreover, local actors tend to have more legitimacy that is needed to attract those who are targeted to join the deradicalization program. Unfortunately, BNPT's initiatives to involve community participation in the social reintegration programs have been limited (Sumpter, Wardhani, & Priyanto, 2021).

The business groups and media groups should be invited to participate in implementing the deradicalization program because these two groups hold potential resources that may help the government to increase the programs' effectiveness (Subagyo, 2021). The business group can provide CSR budgets to finance various entrepreneurship activities, venture capital, and entrepreneurship trainings for the former convicts. Meanwhile, the media has the information power that can contribute to create narratives in the mainstream medias regarding the values of peace, social harmony, and inter-religious unity to build positive public opinions within the community. The positive reception and public opinion will assist with the reintegration process of former convicts, reduce suspicions and threat perceptions among the communities where the ex-convicts will return to. The media's distribution contents with tolerant sentiments will also be useful counter the violent extremist narratives (Subagyo, 2021). Besides that, it is important to note that BNPT's dominant role in deradicalization program has not been effective to respond to the increasing number of terrorism convicts and the outside-prison participants. This condition has complicated the establishment of long-term monitoring system after the programs' completion. Therefore, the involvement of non-government parties can be a very potential option such as the media and business groups are crucial for the establishment of the joint efforts of all levels of the society to combat terrorism. It is also possible to involve private institutions in the deradicalization program in the future to make the programs more effective and efficient (Widya, 2020).

The use of gender aspects in formulating deradicalization programs for convicts and ex-convicts has been neglected by the government, although there are several advantages of including gender in deradicalization and disengagement programs. First, gender analysis is capable to detect different situations, experience and needs of men, women, girls, and boys involved in terrorism. A gender responsive approach will assist the government in prosecution/justice, rehabilitation and integration processes that consider the unequal needs and levels of involvement of women, men and girls and boys. Secondly, the gender approach is important due to the nature of terrorist ideology itself which has gender dimension that distinguishes the roles of men and women in terrorist organizations (Eggert, 2020). In the case of Indonesia, women involved in the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) who play an active role as combatants certainly have different ideologies from women involved in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who are confined to rudimentary roles that are not too central in their actions. Thus, the designing of deradicalization and disengagement programs needs to consider and overcome the gender stereotypes that exist inside the extremist ideology itself.

The next obstacle comes from the inability of peacemaking criminology within the deradicalization framework to support the criminal justice system that has been implemented way before the deradicalization programs were invented (Wozniak, 2002). In this case, deradicalization programs often clash with pre-existing sentencing and legal systems. This can be seen in the implementation of the deradicalization program for convicts in prisons. The long-term deradicalization program since the entry of the terrorist convict into the correctional facility until her or his release has been difficult to be implemented given the non-ideal conditions of the prisons (such as overcapacity) that may backlash into the radicalization of other prisoners (Llewellyn, 2018; Karmini, 2018; Beech, 2016). For this reason, interventions to limit the interaction of terrorist convicts with other prisoners are required and thus add to more burdens for the current detention centres to provide such facilities. The in-prison deradicalization should also aims not only the convicts, but the prison environment itself, such as general prisoners and local officers to strengthen the values of peace and non-violent values that the deradicalization program is trying to achieve. With current situations of Indonesia overcrowding jails, it seems impossible to successfully implement this approach.

The various obstacles are consistent with peacemaking criminology criticisms regarding the practical level issues because the main goal of has been the changes in the level of thinking and seek to foster individual transformation. This is due to the various factors behind individuals' motivations in committing criminal offences, especially terrorist acts. Peacemaking approaches to convicts will not be effective once they return to the same cycle of crime because they are still seeking for the solutions of their previous grievances and problems before they joined the deradicalizations programs. Although it may be effective in overcoming various broad problems such as discrimination (for convicts who want to return to society) and poverty (as a form of fostering economic empowerment), the deradicalization program needs to target the individual level to overcome ideologies and factors that motivated a terrorist to commit acts of terror in the first place.

Conclusion

Despite various efforts to implement the peacemaking criminology approach for countering terrorism in Indonesian deradicalization programs, this approach has not seemed to work effectively due to the absence of a standardized framework or the lack of practical reference as the guidance for the implementation at the technical level. In turn, this approach has led to a new paradox stemming from the difficulty of empirically evaluating the effectiveness of the deradicalization programs. This means that the peaceful ways of reducing radicalism level through the religious and entrepreneurship development have not met their intended goals. Meanwhile, peacemaking criminology in Indonesian deradicalization programs emphasizes the importance of individuals' responsiveness and volunteerism as these factors will significantly contribute to replace the violent-based ideology of the participants towards the peaceful way of thinking. The internalisation of peaceful values in someone's mind requires persuasive and careful efforts to incite the individual's willingness and awareness to leave the violent ideology. The most important thing to ask now is whether the Indonesian deradicalization programs have provided such efforts and whether these efforts are implemented by all the deradicalization officers working with convicts, ex-convicts and these individuals' families. Therefore, an evaluation and review of the Indonesian deradicalization efforts is unnegotiable in order to devise specific and achievable deradicalization efforts to cater the different needs and overcome the main factors behind individual's involvement in terrorism and violent extremism.

The evaluation of deradicalization program demonstrates the urgency to design

sustainable programs that will continuously run amidst the political and social tensions calling for the termination of the programs, and these programs should be equipped with transparent monitoring and evaluation system. It is important to invite non-governmental stakeholders such as business and media enterprises to implement the deradicalization programs in order to establish everyone's "sense of ownership" of the problem and to eradicate the violent extremism problems rampant in Indonesian society. It is important to consider the possibility for a privatized deradicalization program to enhance the programs' effectiveness. Furthermore, there is a need for a re-examination of the deradicalization goal, which previously focused on changing the mindset towards the changes in behavioural aspects or disengagement from violent activities. Despite its weakness in addressing the problems at the personal and cognitive level such as identity crisis, disengagement programs contain measurable and achievable indicators required for monitoring and evaluation mechanism. The lack of counter-narrative skills among the deradicalizations officers in the prison should be eliminated to reduce the chance of being radicalized by the prisoners. In addition, the availability of a new network of relationships (reintegration with society) and the ability for a personal reform is detriment to achieve the goal of disengaging individuals from violent extremism. Finally, a gender-based approach should present in the deradicalization programs due to the different situations and needs of men, women, boys, and girls involved in terrorism and violent extremism. This is also due to the gendered nature of the extremist ideology itself, therefore gender-neutral programs will not be helpful to stop the future recidivism.

Although we have highlighted various impediments of the peace-making deradicalization approach in this article, we believe that the deradicalization goal in instilling the humanistic and empathy values echoed by peacemaking criminology could be done by conducting rigorous research and development prior to the designing of the programs. Such research can be a starting point for a deradicalization program that takes into account the various intersecting fields of research such as criminology, anthropology, sociology, gender studies, international relations, political science and public policy. In addition, a deep exploration to examine the feasibility of privatized deradicalization program will greatly improve the recommendation to overcome the obstacles faced by various government agencies in implementing sustainable deradicalization and disengagement programs. An assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of involving the private sector in deradicalization and disengagement efforts will assist in establishing a comprehensive public-private partnership in security sector.

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